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EGADS! PRESERVATION RUN AMOK: A CALL FOR CHANGE TO 
ARKANSAS’S WAS IT RAISED?, WAS IT DEVELOPED?, WAS IT 
RULED ON? JURISPRUDENCE 
Brian G. Brooks* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Arkansas Court of Appeals issued twenty opinions in cases before 
it on November 19, 2014.1 Half of those opinions held that one or more is-
sues in a case, maybe even all of the issues, would not be decided on the 
merits, at least at that time.2 Three ordered “rebriefing” due to deficiencies 
in the abstract or addendum, so those parties will have a chance to fight an-
other day.3 But seven cases were decided in whole or in part on the basis 
that critical questions directed to the merits of the appeals were not pre-
served for appellate review.4 Assuming no petition for review or rehearing is 
granted, those seven cases are over, and the issues the appellants felt im-
portant enough to brief before the court of appeals will not be decided. 
November 19, 2014, was not an extraordinary day in the court of ap-
peals with respect to cases not decided on the merits, nor would it have been 
extraordinary if the same breakdown had occurred in the Arkansas Supreme 
Court. Appellate practice in Arkansas is complicated,5 and its complexity 
 
*	  	   Brian G. Brooks is a solo practitioner who focuses on appellate practice and com-
plex legal research, writing and advocacy for the plaintiff’s bar. He is also counsel for the 
Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association, amicus counsel for the Tennessee Association for Jus-
tice, and research counsel for the Workers’ Injury Law & Advocacy Group. His office is 
located near Pickles Gap, just between Conway and Greenbrier Arkansas. 
 1. Opinions, Court of Appeals, ARK. JUDICIARY REPOSITORY, http://opinions.aoc.arkan
sas.gov/WebLink8/Browse.aspx?startid=37576&&dbid=0 (last visited February 15, 2015). 
 2. See id. 
 3. Liggins v. State, No. CR-11-415, 2014 Ark. App. 671, at 3, 2014 WL 6485550 
(Nov. 19, 2014); Hernandez v. State, No. CR-14-151, 2014 Ark. App. 667, at 4, 2014 WL 
6489964 (Nov. 19, 2014); Dunn-Wright v. Arkansas State Bd. of Educ., No. CV-14-293, 
2014 Ark. App. 669, at 3, 2014 WL 6490169 (Nov. 19, 2014). 
 4. Smith v. State, No. CR-13-945, 2014 Ark. App. 658, at 2, 2014 WL 6488736 (Nov. 
19, 2014); Rodriguez v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 660, at 6, 449 S.W.3d 306, 311; Porchia v. 
State, No. CR-14-103, 2014 Ark. App. 662, at 2, 2014 WL 6485638 (Nov. 19, 2014); Person 
v. State, No. CR-14-545, 2014 Ark. App. 656, at 2, 2014 WL 6485593 (Nov. 19, 2014); Fox 
v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 666, at 8, n.5, 448 S.W.3d 735; Carter v. 
Cox, No. CV-14-247, 2014 Ark. App. 654, at 4, 2014 WL 6485521 (Nov. 19, 2014); Burks v. 
Liberty Bank, No. CV-13-967, 2014 Ark. App. 672, at 4, 2014 WL 6485664 (Nov. 19, 2014). 
 5. It’s also expensive. The expense arises from the onerous abstracting and addendum 
requirements in which the appellant must convert the stenographically reported record into a 
first person narrative (the abstract) and reproduce copies of portions of the record in the ad-
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often leads to appeals being decided on technical deficiencies rather than on 
their merits. Former Justice Hickman6 and Judge Leon Holmes7 (before he 
was a Judge) likened Arkansas appellate practice to a legal “Serbonian Bog” 
where an unwary practitioner can fall prey to procedural traps that prevent 
appeals from being decided on the merits.8 The cases are legion where either 
the court of appeals or the supreme court avoids reaching one or more of the 
issues presented by the case on appeal because of one procedural error or 
another committed by the appealing party.9 
 
dendum attached to every one of the 18 copies of the brief filed. ARK. R. APP. P. 4-2(a)(5) 
and (8). These requirements need to be reexamined, particularly in the electronic age where 
copies of the entire record can be reduced to an electronic version placed on a disc or a thumb 
drive. See, e.g., Brian G. Brooks, Modest Proposals for Significant Change to the Arkansas 
Rules of Appellate Practice, ATLA DOCKET, Winter 2010, at 18, 19–20. This essay will not 
tackle the sacred abstracting and addendum cows. The preservation rules are enough for one 
writing. Electronic filing has the potential for reducing most, if not all, of this paper waste 
and expense, but thus far that potential has not been realized. The court’s limited use of elec-
tronic filing only added one more burden to filing rather than reducing it. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-
8 (requiring “courtesy” electronic copies of appellate filings). 
 6. Poole v. Poole, 298 Ark. 550, 551–52, 768 S.W.2d 544, 544 (1989) (Hickman, J., 
concurring) (“I have come to the conclusion that it is hazardous for a lawyer to file any mo-
tion for post-judgment relief. He will enter a maze of our rules and our decisions which quali-
fies for the legal ‘Serbonian Bog’ award (which, no doubt, Justice Cardozo intended to estab-
lish by his dissent in the case of Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., [291 U.S. 491 
(1934)]).”). 
 7. Leon Holmes, Pitfalls of the Appellate Practice: Avoiding the Serbonian Bog, ARK. 
LAW., Summer 2000, at 10, 10. 
 8. The “Serbonian Bog” reference is a nod to John Milton who wrote: 
Far off from these a slow and silent stream, 
Lethe, the River of Oblivion, rolls 
Her watery labyrinth, whereof who drinks 
Forthwith his former state and being forgets, 
Forgets both joy and grief, pleasure and pain. 
Beyond this flood a frozen continent 
Lies dark and wild, beat with perpetual storms 
Of whirlwind and dire hail, which on firm land 
Thaws not, but gathers heap, and ruin seems 
Of ancient pile; all else deep snow and ice, 
A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog 
Betwixt Damietta and Mount Casius old, 
Where armies whole have sunk: the parching air 
Burns frore, and cold performs the effect of fire. 
JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 61–62 (David Scott Kastan ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 2005) 
(1667). The reference is to the lake of Serbonis in Egypt that appeared to be solid land be-
cause of the sand that blew around it, but which was in reality a bog. Serbonian, THE FREE 
DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Serbonian (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
 9. I do not attempt to quantify the number of cases in which at least one issue is not 
decided on the merits in an appeal. The cases are too numerous to even begin to review them 
and certainly too numerous to “count” and analyze. But I offer this challenge. Examine the 
opinions issued by the Arkansas Court of Appeals on any particular Wednesday or the Ar-
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Failure to “preserve” an issue for review on appeal is one of the more 
common procedural devices used by the courts to avoid addressing the mer-
its of issues on appeal. Of course, any appellate system will have some pro-
cedural prerequisite that must be met in order to perfect an appeal and have 
the issues appealed decided on the merits, which is not problematic if the 
prerequisites are reasonable. A contemporaneous objection to evidence 
should be required so that the presenting party can work to cure it.10 A time-
ly motion for directed verdict at the close of the case for the party carrying 
the burden of proof (typically the plaintiff but equally applicable to a de-
fendant with respect to things like affirmative defenses) is usually required 
in any appellate system in order to allow an argument that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a proposition.11 An objection to an improper remark 
made in a closing argument is required to allow a trial court to take correc-
tive action, or the issue is barred on appeal.12 And it is reasonable to require 
an issue to arise in some form at the trial court in order to argue it on appeal. 
Doing so allows the opposing side to meet the challenge presented by the 
argument with needed evidence and thus defeat it. 
Arkansas’s preservation rules go much further. This “was it raised, was 
it developed, was it ruled on?” jurisprudence is an escape hatch used all too 
often when no good reason exists so as to avoid the issues on appeal. This 
 
kansas Supreme Court on any particular Thursday. (Those are the days our courts issue opin-
ions absent some extraordinary event, typically in the supreme court). One will readily note 
the number of opinions that turn at least in part on a technical failure of some sort. 
  Nor do I mean to suggest that the supreme court has ignored the problems pointed 
out by Judge Holmes. It has, in fact, addressed several of the procedural traps identified by 
him through rulemaking. Justice Brown pointed them out in his dissent in White v. Davis, 
352 Ark. 183, 188, 99 S.W.3d 409, 413 (2003): 
Over the past decade, a trend has been established in this court to eliminate pro-
cedural pitfalls that resulted in no decision on the merits of a case. Those pitfalls 
were frustrating to both the bench and bar. See, e.g., Leon Holmes, Pitfalls of the 
Appellate Practice: Avoiding the Serbonian Bog, [ARK. LAW., Summer 2000]. 
Some of the more obvious examples have been corrected: (1) the elimination of 
an absolute affirmance for abstract deficiencies (Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(b)); (2) 
providing that a notice of appeal filed before entry of judgment would be consid-
ered filed the day after that entry (Ark. R. App. P.—Civ. 4(a)); (3) providing that 
a notice of appeal filed before an order disposing of posttrial motions shall also 
be deemed filed the day after the entry of that order (Ark. R. App. P.—Civ. 
4(b)(2)); (4) providing that in a criminal trial, a motion for directed verdict at the 
close of all the evidence will be deemed denied when the trial proceeded ahead 
(Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c)). 
Id. at 188, 99 S.W.3d at 413 (Brown, J., dissenting). White is discussed more fully below. 
 10. E.g., ARK. R. EVID. 103(a)(1). 
 11. E.g., ARK. R. CIV. P. 50; FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
 12. E.g., Butler Mfg. Co. v. Hughes, 292 Ark. 198, 206, 731 S.W.2d 214, 215 (1987). 
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jurisprudence should be rethought.13 This essay explains how these preserva-
tion rules run amok, and concludes that justice is better served by modifying 
them. A more lenient approach leading to more cases decided on the merits 
is then advocated. 
II. “WAS IT RAISED? WAS IT DEVELOPED? WAS IT RULED ON?” 
JURISPRUDENCE: WHERE IT WORKS AND HOW IT HAS RUN AMOK 
Here is the basic rule: In order for an issue to be addressed by the Ar-
kansas appellate courts, it must be raised before the trial court, sufficiently 
developed in the trial court to allow an informed discussion, and actually 
ruled on by the trial court.14 Those words seem simple enough and easily 
complied with. They are not, however, because they are interpreted to re-
quire a high degree of precision that often trips even the most experienced 
practitioner. An examination of situations where preservation serves legiti-
mate purposes contrasted with cases where preservation bars appellate re-
view, but accomplishes really nothing, is useful to see this point. 
A. Preservation Correctly Used: Where It Works 
The need to raise and argue an issue to a trial court in order to preserve 
it for appeal is not offensive on its face. It can, and often does, serve legiti-
mate purposes, most specifically to allow either the parties or the trial court 
to correct the deficiency complained of and avoid any issue on appeal to 
begin with. Some simple examples make the point. 
As noted above, a basic Rule of Evidence is that a contemporaneous 
objection must be lodged to the admission of evidence when it is offered in 
order to preserve an argument that the evidence should not have been admit-
ted when the case is appealed.15 This Rule makes sense when one under-
 
 13. In the interest of full disclosure, I’ve written on this topic before in two articles, one 
simply advising the practitioner about the preservation rules and how to make sure they are 
met and the other calling for change very much like I do here. Brian Brooks, Is it Raised? Is 
it Developed? Is it Specific? Preserving Your Issues for Appeal, ATLA DOCKET, Fall 2007, at 
20; Brian G. Brooks, Modest Proposals for Significant Change to the Arkansas Rules of 
Appellate Practice, ATLA DOCKET, Winter 2010, at 18. 
 14. The preservation rules work to the disadvantage of the appellant primarily. An ap-
pellee can, from time to time, convince the appellate courts to address an issue not meeting 
the letter of these rules on the basis that the court will affirm the trial court when it reaches 
the correct conclusion but for a different reason. Riddle v. Udouj, 371 Ark. 452, 458, 267 
S.W. 3d 586, 591 (2007) (citing Middleton v. Lockhart, 355 Ark. 434, 439, 139 S.W.3d 500, 
503 (2003)). It’s a significant risk, however, to attempt to bring an issue up on appeal that is 
not preserved in the manner described here, even for an appellee. It’s just too easy for the 
courts to avoid it based on the preservation rules. 
 15. ARK. R. EVID. 103. 
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stands that quite often, corrective action can be taken that cures the deficien-
cy. For example, if a party wants to introduce a photograph into evidence 
and the objection is that the exhibit has not been authenticated, a few follow 
up questions can usually cure the deficiency (or confirm it, whichever the 
case may be). All the Rules of Evidence, specifically Rule 901, require is 
that the proponent of the evidence offer enough “to support a finding that 
the matter in question is what the proponent claims” it to be.16 Rule 901 
even lists “illustrations” of methods of authentication.17 It would be unfair 
and nonsensical to allow the objector to sit idly by only to raise this sort of 
issue on appeal. 
This basic principle extends to much more complicated situations. Ar-
kansas follows the so-called Daubert analysis for admissibility of expert 
testimony through which an opponent of the evidence may challenge the 
expert’s methodology and thereby seek to exclude the evidence, or parts of 
it. The name derives from Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.18 
and the analysis was adopted in Arkansas in Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Foote.19 The analysis charges trial courts with undertaking a prelimi-
nary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying expert 
testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodology 
correctly can be applied to the facts at issue.20 
Under the Daubert/Foote analysis, many factors may apply and no de-
finitive checklist exists.21 Typical factors to be considered in the analysis are 
the expert’s credentials; whether the expert’s methodology has been the sub-
ject of peer review; potential error rate; standards; and general acceptance in 
the scientific community, but these factors are not exhaustive, and they must 
be applied in a flexible manner.22 The Daubert court noted the capabilities 
of the jury and the adversary system generally, including “vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on 
the burden of proof,” as “traditional and appropriate means of attacking 
 
 16. ARK. R. EVID. 901. 
 17. ARK. R. EVID. 901(b)(1)–(10). 
 18. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence and recognized that the “general 
acceptance” test for the admissibility of scientific evidence that was pronounced in Frye v. 
U.S., 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923), had been superseded by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 586–87. The Court noted that the rigid standard in Frye 
would be at odds with the Federal Rules’ liberal thrust and their general approach of relaxing 
the traditional barriers to opinion testimony. Id. at 588–89. The Court later extended the 
holding in Daubert essentially to all expert testimony, including technical and engineering 
experts. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 19. 341 Ark. 105, 115, 14 S.W.3d 512, 519 (2000). 
 20. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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shaky but admissible evidence.”23 Those conventional devices, along with 
the trial court’s ability to direct a verdict or grant summary judgment in ap-
propriate cases, are safeguards against pseudoscience, rather than wholesale 
exclusion where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards of Rule 
702.24 
Clearly, the Daubert/Foote analysis is something that ought to be 
raised and developed before the trial court before a party is allowed to pur-
sue it on appeal. The multi-factor analysis is fact driven, and a record must 
be created to examine whether it is met. It would be wholly unfair to allow 
an opponent of an expert to sit by in the trial court and do nothing, then 
claim for the first time on appeal that the expert’s methodology was flawed. 
The expert might easily have been able to cure the deficiency if the issue 
was raised below. 
Just as parties might be able to cure a deficiency with a contemporane-
ous objection, so too might the trial court. A contemporaneous objection to a 
remark in closing argument must be made in the trial court for good reason. 
Butler Manufacturing Co. v. Hughes25 is an example. Robert Hughes was 
shocked while using a “roof runner” and fell from a roof.26 He and his wife 
sued Butler Manufacturing, from whom the roof runner was leased, alleging 
products liability and negligence theories.27 The jury found in their favor and 
awarded nearly $1 million.28 Butler appealed.29 One primary issue on appeal 
was whether the Hugheses’ attorney made an improper closing argument.30 
The Hugheses had offered the testimony of an expert consulting engineer on 
quality control.31 The trial court limited the expert’s testimony to quality 
control in general, excluding any reference to quality control at Butler spe-
cifically.32 When the Hugheses’ attorney and the witness ventured into that 
area anyway, the trial court sustained an objection.33 Nevertheless, the 
Hugheses’ attorney made specific (and speculative) reference to quality con-
trol at Butler and the witness’s testimony during his closing argument.34 But 
Butler did not object contemporaneously.35 Instead it waited until after clos-
 
 23. Id. at 596. 
 24. Id. at 594–95. 
 25. 292 Ark. 198, 729 S.W.2d 142 (1987). 
 26. Id. at 200, 729 S.W.2d at 143. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Butler, 292 Ark. at 200, 729 S.W.2d at 143. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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ing was completed and the jury was excused to raise the issue, then asked 
for a mistrial.36 The trial court denied the request.37 
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed holding that Butler waived the 
ability to seek a mistrial by failing to raise a contemporaneous objection.38 
That was so because “by waiting until after closing arguments when they 
were out of the presence of the jury to make a motion for mistrial, Butler’s 
attorney did not give the trial court the opportunity to correct any error 
committed during the closing argument.”39 Obviously, had the objection 
been made at the time of the argument, the trial court could have admon-
ished counsel and instructed the jury to ignore the remark. That opportunity 
was lost by the failure to object. 
John Cheeseman Trucking, Inc. v. Dougan40 is in accord. Eleven vehi-
cles were involved in an accident on Interstate 40 caused by smoke covering 
the highway.41 Trucks owned by John Cheeseman Trucking and Mallinck-
rodt, Inc. stopped on the highway because their drivers could not see, and 
vehicles coming from behind collided with them.42 Four people were 
killed.43 In a procedurally complicated case, liability was found against de-
fendants related to the Cheeseman and Mallinkrodt entities, the Mallinck-
rodt defendants settled, and the Cheeseman defendants had judgment en-
tered against them, then appealed.44 
One issue on appeal was that a mistrial should have been granted be-
cause of an improper closing argument by one of the prevailing parties.45 
The argument made was a speculative rendition of the type of training the 
jury’s verdict might suggest to the presidents of the defendant companies 
needed to be put in place for their drivers, but no objection was made to 
it.46A motion for mistrial was made later, and it was denied.47 The supreme 
court affirmed because of the failure to object contemporaneously, which 
deprived the trial court of the opportunity to correct the error committed in 
the argument.48 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Butler, 292 Ark. at 200, 729 S.W.2d at 143. 
 38. Id. at 206, 729 S.W.2d at 147. 
 39. Id. at 202, 729 S.W.2d at 144. 
 40. 313 Ark. 229, 853 S.W.2d 278 (1993). 
 41. Id. at 231, 853 S.W.2d at 279. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. Id. at 231, 853 S.W.2d at 280. 
 44. Id. at 231–32, 853 S.W.2d at 280. 
 45. Id. at 236, 853 S.W.2d at 282. 
 46. Cheeseman, 313 Ark. at 236–37, 853 S.W.2d at 282–83. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 237–38, 853 S.W.2d at 283. 
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Jones Rigging & Heavy Hauling v. Parker49 is another example, this 
time outside of the area of closing arguments. Shannon and Rodney Parker 
collided with a Jones Rigging truck and were injured.50 The jury found 
against the Parkers and they moved for a new trial.51 The basis of their mo-
tion was that they were prejudiced by new information introduced by a wit-
ness at trial regarding Jones Rigging’s dissolution.52 But they did not object 
to this evidence when it was presented.53 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
reversed the grant of a new trial because a contemporaneous objection and 
request for a continuance is required when a party is faced with surprise 
evidence in a civil case.54 In fact, the court held that Rule 59 was misapplied 
when the new trial was granted.55 The court pointed out that the trial court 
could cure the deficiency by granting a continuance when the surprise evi-
dence is presented and objected to.56 
Sensible use of the requirement for a contemporaneous objection is 
seen in Rule of Civil Procedure 51’s direction that objections to jury instruc-
tions must be timely and precise. Rule 51 reads, 
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruc-
tion unless he objects thereto before or at the time the instruction is giv-
en, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of 
his objection, and no party may assign as error the failure to instruct on 
any issue unless such party has submitted a proposed instruction on that 
issue. Opportunity shall be given to make objections to instructions out 
of the hearing of the jury. A mere general objection shall not be suffi-
cient to obtain appellate review of the court’s action relating to instruc-
tions to the jury except as to an instruction directing a verdict or the 
court’s action in declining to do so.57  
While one could argue with some of the details of the Rule, as I will do 
below, the basic idea that a reasonably-specific objection to an instruction 
ought to be required is good. That is so, obviously, because by raising the 
objection and explaining it sufficiently, the trial court and the parties can 
work to correct the deficiency and avoid the issue on appeal altogether. 
Waiting until the appeal to make the objection makes no sense. 
 
 49. 347 Ark. 628, 66 S.W.3d 599 (2002). 
 50. Id. at 630–31, 66 S.W.3d at 601. 
 51. Id. at 631–32, 66 S.W.3d at 601. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 632, 66 S.W.3d at 601. 
 54. Id. at 633–37, 66 S.W.3d at 602–05. 
 55. Jones Rigging, 347 Ark. at 636–37, 66 S.W.3d at 605. 
 56. Id. at 633–34, 66 S.W.3d at 602–03. This statement is something of an oversimplifi-
cation of Jones Rigging. More was wrong with the grant of a new trial than simply failing to 
object and seek a continuance, but this principle is sufficient for purposes of this essay. 
 57. ARK. R.CIV. P. 51. 
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Turning to criminal cases, Rule 33.1 of the Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure requires a defendant in a criminal trial to move for directed verdict, 
dismissal or an acquittal at the close of the evidence, and if he so moves at 
the close of the State’s case, to renew the motion at the close of all of the 
evidence.58 The Rule also requires the motion made at the close of the 
State’s case or the close of evidence to “specify the respect in which the 
evidence is deficient. A motion merely stating that the evidence is insuffi-
cient does not preserve for appeal issues relating to a specific deficiency 
such as insufficient proof on the elements of the offense.”59 Thus, it is not 
good enough simply to move for directed verdict or acquittal and point out 
that “[t]he State has failed to meet its burden of proof of establishing that 
[the defendant] has in fact violated [a] specific penal statute.”60 The defend-
ant must specifically set out how the State failed to carry its burden.61 The 
reason for this precision is to allow the trial court to reopen the State’s case 
so it can meet the identified deficiency.62 
This discussion is not meant to be an exhaustive listing of the areas 
where preservation is used or even where it is used properly. It does exem-
plify, however, what preservation is correctly used to do, namely to allow 
the parties or the trial court to adjust, amend, build a record or correct so as 
to make the trial right in the first instance. All of these instances have that 
theme in common, and it is a theme worth having. That theme, of course, 
creates another benefit. Where issues are raised and developed below the 
record is much more likely to be fully and adequately built so that any deci-
sion on appeal is informed by adequate facts where needed. Arkansas’s 
preservation jurisprudence goes much further, however. Indeed, it has run 
amok. The discussion turns there. 
B. Preservation Run Amok: Where it Merely Frustrates 
Preservation rules that serve no real purpose other than to prevent ad-
dressing issues on appeal are readily found in Arkansas cases. White v. Da-
 
 58. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.1(a) and (b). 
 59. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.1(c). 
 60. Hendrix v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 696, at *3. Hendrix, a case I was assigned to as 
appellate counsel, is a problematic case. The argument on appeal was that the facts proven 
simply do not establish every element of the crime alleged. The State had no intention of 
reopening its case because it disagreed with Mr. Hendrix’s reading of the criminal statute. 
Whose reading is correct was not addressed by the court of appeals because the motion for 
acquittal was not specific enough under Rule 33.1. This seems to be an extreme application 
of the Rule under which a person actually innocent of the crime charged nevertheless remains 
in prison because of the wording of a trial motion alone. 
 61. Id. at *5–7. 
 62. McClina v. State, 354 Ark. 384, 394, 123 S.W.3d 883, 889 (2003). 
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vis63 is a classic example. Noel Baker chose 80 heifers to buy from Gary 
Davis’ dairy farm in Missouri and paid $104,000 for them.64 The heifers Mr. 
Davis delivered, though, were not the heifers Mr. Baker selected.65 When 
Mr. Davis refused to refund Mr. Baker’s money, Mr. Baker sued in Searcy 
County, Arkansas.66 Mr. Davis moved to dismiss, arguing that his contacts 
with Arkansas were insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over him in 
the Arkansas courts.67 The trial judge denied the motion and eventually en-
tered judgment against Mr. Davis for $360,657.93.68 
Mr. Davis moved for a new trial and reasserted his personal jurisdiction 
argument.69 A hearing was held on the motion before a new circuit judge in 
Faulkner County, which was in the same judicial district as Searcy County.70 
Mr. Baker’s lawyer objected to the hearing being held outside of Searcy 
County but did not specifically cite the venue statute that made him cor-
rect.71 According to the court: 
Noel Baker’s counsel noted that the case had been tried in Searcy Coun-
ty, but the motion was being heard in Faulkner County. Counsel stated 
that “we are here because of the moving party, and not by agreement. 
We do not agree to the hearing. It is our position that this is outside the 
venue of the court action. The original court file . . . is not here, and nei-
ther is the docket.”72  
The trial judge responded “All righty. All righty.”73 He then proceeded 
to hear argument and rule in Mr. Davis’s favor on the personal jurisdiction 
issue.74 
Mr. Baker appealed, but the Arkansas Supreme Court refused to reach 
the merits of the venue issue because it was not preserved for appeal.75 The 
court wrote, 
Here, Noel Baker’s counsel told the judge that he did not agree to the 
hearing, and it was counsel’s position that venue was in Searcy County, 
not Faulkner County. However, counsel made no mention of the venue 
 
 63. 352 Ark. 183, 99 S.W.3d 409 (2003). 
 64. Id. at 184, 99 S.W.3d at 410. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. Mr. Baker died during the case and Vicki White as the executrix of his estate was 
substituted as the plaintiff, thus the caption of the case. 
 67. Id. at 184, 99 S.W.3d at 411. 
 68. Id. 
 69. White, 352 Ark. at 185, 99 S.W.3d at 411. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-317 (repealed 2003). 
 72. White, 352 Ark. at 185, 99 S.W.3d at 411. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. White, 352 Ark. at 185–87, 99 S.W.3d at 411–13. 
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statute, § 16-13-317, he now attempts to argue on appeal. Although the 
statute authorized the judge to hold the hearing in Faulkner County to 
render “appropriate orders” with respect to the pending cause in Searcy 
County, counsel failed to point out to the judge that only “contested cas-
es” may not be tried outside the county of venue of the case without 
agreement of the parties. . . . Despite this failure, Noel Baker now raises 
those specific venue issues in this appeal, although those issues were 
never brought to the trial judge’s attention for a ruling below. 
Consistency requires that we follow our long-standing rule that a moving 
party bears the burden of obtaining a ruling on any objection, and in the 
absence of such a ruling, the issues are not preserved for our review. Be-
cause Baker did not properly obtain a ruling on his objection to venue 
being in Faulkner County, we are unable to reach the merits of this ap-
peal, and the decision of the trial court is affirmed.76 
Dissenting, Justice Brown took the court to task for holding that Mr. 
Baker failed to obtain a ruling and thus failing to preserve the venue issue 
for appeal,77 but this case actually exemplifies how all three preservation 
requirements (raising, developing and obtaining a ruling) have run amok. 
Although Mr. Baker’s attorney raised venue as an issue, he did not “men-
tion” the specific venue statute, thus the court determined that the issue was 
not sufficiently raised.78 Compounding his problems, he did not “point out” 
how the statute controlled and made him correct, thus the court felt the issue 
was not adequately developed.79 And, finally, he did not “obtain” a ruling on 
his venue objection.80 
This type of specificity is what makes Arkansas appellate practice so 
like the Serbonian Bog and explains how preservation has run amok. Coun-
sel told the trial judge that he could not hear the case in Faulkner County 
and that the hearing was objected to.81 He said “venue” was not proper.82 
The trial court quipped “All Righty,” then moved on to entertain argument 
 
 76. Id. at 186–87, 99 S.W.3d 412–13 (internal citations omitted). 
 77. Justice Brown wrote, 
According to the majority, there was no ruling on the appellant’s objection to the 
hearing taking place in Faulkner County. I ask the rhetorical question: What 
could be more of a ruling than proceeding with the hearing in Faulkner County 
when that was the basis for the objection? Holding that no ruling was made un-
der these circumstances elevates the importance of uttering one word—
”denied”—to dizzying heights. 
Id. at 188, 99 S.W.3d at 413 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 186–87, 99 S.W.3d 412–13. 
 79. Id. at 187, 99 S.W.3d 414. 
 80. Id. 
 81. White, 352 Ark. at 185, 99 S.W.3d at 412. 
 82. Id. 
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and rule.83 The issue was raised, it was developed, and it was effectively 
ruled on. 
What is more important is that the specificity White requires simply 
does not advance the reasons preservation exists as set out above. Neither 
the trial court nor the parties needed any more than what Mr. Baker’s coun-
sel argued in order to address and correct the deficiency that was pointed out 
by the objection. No more evidence needed to be developed, no case needed 
to be reopened, no curative instruction needed to be given, or anything of 
the like. Preservation served no purpose other than avoiding ruling on the 
merits. 
This avoidance mechanism manifests itself in some interesting and 
bothersome cases. One example is Abo v. Walker,84 a child custody case. 
Meagan Abo and Bart Walker are the unmarried parents of BW.85 After 
Meagan and Bart’s relationship ended, BW lived primarily with Bart from 
May 2012 to March 2013, when Bart sued to establish his paternity and for 
primary custody.86 Meagan responded by correctly noting that by statute she 
was the legal custodian.87 Section 9-10-113 of the Arkansas Code vests cus-
tody in the mother when a child is born out of wedlock.88 The trial court 
awarded custody to Bart.89 Meagan appealed, arguing that, because of the 
presumption created by the statute, Bart had to prove a material change in 
circumstances before being given custody and he never even attempted to do 
so.90 In other words, she argued that the law imposed that burden on him and 
he failed to carry it.91 The court of appeals held that the issue was not pre-
served for appeal.92 While Meagan responded to Bart’s petition for custody 
by arguing that the statute vested custody in her, she apparently never said 
the words “material change in circumstances” in the trial court, so, accord-
ing to the court of appeals, she neither raised the issue nor obtained a ruling 
on the point.93 
The problem with the court of appeals’s ruling is that the statute very 
clearly places custody of a child born out of wedlock with the mother of the 
child.94 Bart’s suit was one to change custody from Meagan to himself. Ar-
 
 83. Id. 
 84. 2014 Ark. App. 500. 
 85. Id. at *1. 
 86. Id. at *1–2. 
 87. Id. at *3. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at *2–3. 
 90. Abo, 2014 Ark. App. 500, at *3. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at *4. 
 93. Id. 
 94. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-10-113(a) (2009) (“When a child is born to an unmarried 
woman, legal custody of that child shall be in the woman giving birth to the child until the 
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kansas law requires the biological father of a child born out of wedlock to 
prove a change in circumstances in order for that father to obtain custody.95 
Meagan very clearly relied on the placement of that burden by pleading that 
she was the biological mother and that BW was born out of wedlock.96 She 
had nothing left to prove at that point. The burden was solely on Bart. He 
knew, or should have known, at that point that he had to prove a material 
change in circumstances in order to prevail. 
Thus, with Meagan’s reliance on the statute, the parties and the trial 
court had all of the information they needed in order to try the case correct-
ly. Meagan’s failure to utter the words “material change in circumstances” 
did not deprive Bart of the ability to develop his case or the trial court of the 
opportunity to cure a deficiency. Preservation served no purpose other than 
avoiding ruling on the merits. 
Strict adherence to preservation rules often leads to avoiding pure ques-
tions of law that do not need factual development and over which the trial 
courts have, or should have, little discretion. Abo can be seen as a case in 
that category. The law placed custody of BW with Meagan because of the 
circumstances of BW’s birth, and the law required Bart to prove a change in 
circumstances before altering that custody.97 The “box” in which the case 
was to be decided was defined by the law, and the use of strict rules of 
preservation allowed the law to be circumvented. 
Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc.98 is another example. Theresa 
Paulino was paralyzed by a surgery she claimed was negligently per-
formed.99 Her suit, however, went beyond the typical medical negligence 
case and alleged that the hospital was negligent in even granting privileges 
to her surgeon to treat patients like her.100 This “negligent credentialing” 
theory of recovery had never been recognized in Arkansas.101 The issue was 
exhaustively briefed and argued by the parties to the trial court, which held 
that the theory would not be recognized in Arkansas.102 
Ms. Paulino appealed. Along with the arguments pressed so diligently 
in the trial court, Ms. Paulino argued that a particular statute, section 17-95-
107, essentially recognized negligent credentialing in Arkansas and that it 
certainly defeated any notion that Arkansas’s Peer Review Statute103 immun-
 
child reaches eighteen (18) years of age unless a court of competent jurisdiction enters an 
order placing the child in the custody of another party.”). 
 95. Norwood v. Robinson, 315 Ark. 255, 256–59, 866 S.W.2d 398, 399–401 (1993). 
 96. Abo, 2014 Ark. App. 500 at 2. 
 97. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 98. 2012 Ark. 55, 386 S.W.3d 462 (2012). 
 99. Id. at 1–2, 386 S.W.3d at 463–64. 
 100. Id. at 3, 386 S.W.3d at 464. 
 101. Id. at 6, 386 S.W.3d at 465. 
 102. Id. at 4–7, 386 S.W.3d at 465–66. 
 103. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-9-501 to -503. 
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ized credentialers from suit.104 This statute was not mentioned in the lower 
court, however, and thus the court avoided analyzing its significance merely 
by holding that the issue was not preserved.105 In a footnote, the court wrote: 
We are precluded from addressing the Paulinos’ contention that Arkan-
sas Code Annotated section 17-95-107 provides access to credentialing 
information by patients who bring negligent-credentialing claims be-
cause this contention was not made below. It is well settled that we will 
not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal.106 
The “contention” in the case was that negligently credentialing a physi-
cian was actionable. It was a question of law. If a particular statute may ei-
ther create that cause of action or support it, then no harm comes from enter-
taining a purely legal argument arising from it. The parties had no need to 
adjust their case below to meet the argument, and the trial court had no defi-
ciency it could have corrected. Preservation served no purpose other than 
avoiding ruling on the merits. 
Two cases about which I have written in the past are worth discussing 
again because they make the point well.107 In Whorton v. Dixon,108 the plain-
tiff challenged the portion of the medical-malpractice act that precludes 
medical-care defendants from having to give testimony about the standard 
of care.109 A decisive question was the level of constitutional scrutiny to be 
employed by the court when reviewing the statute.110 All through the plain-
tiff’s briefs strict scrutiny was employed in the analysis, but apparently no 
argument was devoted exclusively to that point outside of citation.111 The 
court found that to be insufficient, writing as follows: 
Notwithstanding Whorton’s contention on appeal that strict scrutiny is 
the appropriate standard of review, she never made that argument below. 
In fact, at the hearing on her motion, Whorton failed to object when Dr. 
Dixon applied the rational-basis standard of review. As a result, rational-
basis review was the test accepted and used by the circuit court in reach-
ing its decision. In order to preserve an argument for appeal, the issue 
must be made and developed before the circuit court.112 
 
 104. See Paulino, 2012 Ark. 55 at 14, n.2, 386 S.W.3d at 469, n.2. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Brooks, supra note 13, at 20. 
 108. 363 Ark. 330, 214 S.W.3d 225 (2005). 
 109. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-207(3) (2006). 
 110. Whorton, 363 Ark. at 332–33, 214 S.W.3d at 227–28. 
 111. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 1, Whorton v. Dixon, 363 Ark. 330, 214 S.W.3d 
225 (2005) (No. 04-1031). The Author assisted the plaintiff’s counsel in preparing for oral 
argument and reviewed the briefs at that time. 
 112. Whorton, 363 Ark. at 333, 214 S.W.3d at 228. 
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The level of constitutional scrutiny, of course, is a legal standard at is-
sue every time an act of any legislature is challenged. It is raised by the na-
ture of the argument. Making the point in argument to the trial court should 
be sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. And if more was needed to be 
done, the better course of action was a remand. Preservation served no pur-
pose other than avoiding ruling on the merits. 
Sowders v. St. Joseph’s Mercy Health Center113 is similar. This case 
“whipsawed”114 the plaintiff between Clayborn v. Bankers Standard Insur-
ance Co.115 and Scamardo v. Jaggers116 on the one hand and Low v. Insur-
ance Company of North America117 on the other. Mary Sowders sued St. 
Joseph during the time when Clayborn and Scamardo were the law and a 
suit was allowed against a charity, but a prevailing plaintiff could not collect 
against the assets of the charity.118 During the pendency of the case, howev-
er, the law changed back to what it previously was when Low held that a 
charity could not be sued at all, and that an action could be maintained 
against the charity’s liability insurer by way of Arkansas’s direct-action 
statute.119 The trial court entered summary judgment against Ms. Sowders, 
holding that charitable immunity was the law of the state, and that it barred 
suit against St. Joseph.120 One argument made by Ms. Sowders both at the 
trial court and on appeal, and made in great detail, was that the doctrine of 
charitable immunity should be abrogated by the court.121 But the Arkansas 
Supreme Court did not address the issue. Even though the trial court de-
clared charitable immunity to be the law of the state, the court could not 
locate a specific ruling on this policy question, thus the court held that it was 
not preserved for appeal.122 
The trial court had no choice but to recognize the defense of charitable 
immunity. Controlling Arkansas Supreme Court precedent upheld the doc-
trine. The trial court could only rule one way. Preservation served no pur-
pose other than avoiding ruling on the merits. 
I wrote above that I would quibble with the application of Rule 51 of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Koch v. Northport Health Services of Arkan-
sas123 is that quibble. Koch is a nursing-home case.124 The defendants object-
 
 113. 368 Ark. 466, 247 S.W.3d 514 (2007). 
 114. Id. at 477, 247 S.W.3d at 522 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
 115. 348 Ark. 557, 75 S.W.3d 174 (2002). 
 116. 356 Ark. 236, 149 S.W.3d 311 (2004). 
 117. 364 Ark. 427, 220 S.W.3d 670 (2005). 
 118. Sowders, 368 Ark. at 468–69, 247 S.W.3d at 516–17. 
 119. Id. at 469, 247 S.W.3d at 517; ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-210. 
 120. Sowders, 368 Ark. at 469, 247 S.W.3d at 517. 
 121. Id. at 468–69, 247 S.W.3d at 516–17. 
 122. Id. at 477, 247 S.W.3d at 522. 
 123. 361 Ark. 192, 205 S.W.3d 754 (2005). I’ve written about Koch before as well, but 
what it demonstrates is so very clear that repetition is forgivable I think. 
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ed to the giving of a jury instruction based on Instruction 601 of the Arkan-
sas Model Instructions, 4th Edition.125 That instruction, briefly stated, tells 
the jury that violation of a statute or regulation may be evidence of negli-
gence, and then sets forth the relevant statutory or regulatory language.126 
The plaintiff in the case sought to give the instruction using the federal 
regulations governing nursing homes as the regulation at issue.127 The de-
fendants objected.128 Their precise objection at trial was: 
As to Jury Instruction Number Fifteen, Defendants object to the giving 
of that instruction which is a violation of statute or ordinance is evidence 
of negligence. Defendants contend that this is an exceedingly lengthy, 
drawn out jury instruction which there really is no hope for the jury to 
understand. It gives well in excess of ten or twelve Code of Federal Reg-
ister references, one to which the jury, the defendants would contend, 
have no hope of interpreting and applying. It is fully covered by the oth-
er instructions in this case. It is confusing and refers to negligence, again 
going back to our objection to giving this case to the jury on both negli-
gence and medical malpractice.129 
The trial court denied the objection, and the defendants appealed. They 
argued that the trial court erred because Arkansas Model Instruction 601 
only allows a regulation to be used if it creates a standard of care, and the 
regulations do not create a standard of care.130 The Arkansas Supreme Court 
wrote that the issue was not preserved because the defendants did not use 
the words “standard of care” in the objection.131 What the court did not ex-
plain is exactly how that degree of precision would have changed anything. 
The trial court could not have altered the instruction in any way to meet the 
objection. More to the point, it raises a pure question of law about the validi-
ty of the instruction in the context of any nursing home case. With an objec-
tion to the giving of the instruction in general in place, holding that the issue 
was not sufficiently preserved seems not to advance any particular purpose. 
Arkansas’s preservation rules reach far beyond ensuring that the parties 
and the trial courts have the opportunity to address and correct deficiencies 
that might cure objections. They allow issues to be avoided based on lack of 
technical precision. The result is that important issues in far-reaching cases 
are not decided. The Bench, the Bar and the public would be better served if 
preservation were reigned in. 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 209, 205 S.W.3d at 767. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Koch, 361 Ark. at 207, 205 S.W.3d at 766. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 209, 205 S.W.3d at 767. 
2015] PRESERVATION RUN AMOK 283 
III. REIGNING IN THE “WAS IT RAISED? WAS IT DEVELOPED? WAS IT RULED 
ON?” JURISPRUDENCE: A SUGGESTION FOR CHANGE 
With the discussion above, suggestions for change should be apparent. 
They are easily stated. 
First, preservation should accomplish a goal other than avoiding an is-
sue on appeal. Where it does, it should remain. Where a party may be preju-
diced by the failure of the opponent to raise adequately an issue below, then 
failure to raise it should bar appellate review. Likewise, where an adequate 
objection would allow the trial court to correct a deficiency if made, failure 
to raise one should bar review. 
The examples set out in Part II.A of this essay are typical. Evidentiary 
objections can often be cured and should be made. In most instances, jury 
instruction objections are useful to get the instructions right and need to be 
made. Indeed, where preservation is truly necessary to have a fair resolution 
of the issue on appeal, it should be adhered to. 
Second, where preservation does not accomplish any goal other than 
avoiding an issue on appeal, it should bend. Pure issues of law are the best 
example. Rarely is anything advanced, other than delay, when the appellate 
courts avoid deciding a question of law adequately presented by the record 
before them. Whether the precise wording of the issue was raised to the trial 
court, and certainly whether it was decided by the trial court, is often irrele-
vant. The question should be decided when the record allows it to be so. The 
Sowders court, for example, had everything it needed to address charitable 
immunity as a policy matter irrespective of what the trial court had to say 
about it. 
Third, “Was it Ruled On?” is particularly hard to justify as a rule of 
preservation in many instances. For one thing, if the party pressing the issue 
lost after raising and arguing the issue below, then by implication the ques-
tion was “ruled on” in the negative. For another, what the trial court may 
have decided is often of no moment for ultimately determining the question. 
Only where the trial court’s decision makes a real difference in how the ap-
pellate court resolves the problem should the failure to obtain a ruling make 
any difference on appeal. The trial judge in White did all that needed to be 
done to “rule” adequately enough to allow the question to be addressed on 
appeal. 
Fourth, where preservation is a concern, the appellate courts should be 
open to a remand to address them rather than falling back on a preservation 
default. For example, in Abo, a legitimate action for the appellate court 
would have been to remand the case for correct application of the law. Af-
firming based on a purely technical preservation rule was unneeded. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Preservation can serve a purpose. It can make the record better, more 
complete and ensure that opportunities to correct deficiencies and avoid 
issues on appeal are taken. But preservation can run amok and serve no pur-
pose other than avoiding issues on appeal. Where it does, it should bend and 
the technicalities should be set aside. 
Altering the “Was it Raised? Was it Developed? Was it Ruled On?” ju-
risprudence discussed here does not involve changing a Rule of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule of Evidence, or Rule of Appellate Procedure.132 It involves appel-
late courts approaching their task differently and addressing issues important 
to cases when neither party to the case will be prejudiced unfairly by doing 
so even if the strict preservation rules are not met. Implementing this change 
is, therefore, remarkably simple. So long as both sides are fairly on notice 
that the issue is raised by the case and have ample opportunity to meet it 
below, the appellate courts should address it on appeal. 
 
 
 132. Rule 33.1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure discussed above is a notable exception. 
That Rule might require some measure of change to its wording to adopt the preservation 
standard advocated here, but the change is easily accomplished. The Rule could simply re-
quire the State to show that it would have asked to reopen its case to present evidence to 
bridge the gap had the defendant made his or her objection more clear and then proffer the 
evidence for the record. 
